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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to his parents were privileged unless the minor defendant was af-
forded the right to communicate privately or was warned that any
overheard utterances may be used against him.
Included among the appellate division cases analyzed is Adler
& Topal, P.C. v. Exclusive Envelope Corp., involving the extent to
which a plaintiff could invoke the 6-year statute of limitations for
breach of contract where his complaint against an accountant
sounded essentially in malpractice. Notably, the second depart-
ment restricted the Court of Appeals' decision in Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Enco Associates, which held the 6-year period applicable
when the claim arose from an underlying written agreement. The
court distinguished Sears, holding that a malpractice claim, arising
from a simple oral agreement, was subject to the 3-year statute of
limitations.
It is hoped that the cases treated in this issue of The Survey
will keep the bar abreast of the important recent developments in
New York law.
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
Article 2-Limitations of Time
CPLR 214(6): Three-year statute of limitations governs claim
of accountants' malpractice notwithstanding the existence of an
underlying oral agreement between the parties
Section 214 of the CPLR requires that malpractice actions,
other than claims for medical malpractice, must be commenced
within 3 years1 from the time of their accrual.2 In determining the
CPLR 214(6) (McKinney Supp. 19811982). In addition to nonmedical malpractice
claims, actions to recover for personal injuries or property damage are covered by the 3-year
statute of limitations. CPLR 214(4),(5) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Prior to 1877, how-
ever, actions to recover for personal injuries and property damage, as well as for breach of
contract, were governed by a 6-year limitations period. 1 WK&M 214.11, at 2-290. It is
interesting to note that early common law recognized no fixed period of time for instituting
an action. See Trepuk v. Frank, 58 App. Div. 2d 556, 557, 396 N.Y.S.2d 18, 18 (1st Dep't
1976), rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 723, 376 N.E.2d 924, 405 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1978).
2 In both medical and nonmedical malpractice claims, the cause of action accrues on
Ohe date of the alleged malpractice. See 1 WK&M T 214.18, at 2-305. There are two recog-
nized exceptions to this general rule, however, in medical malpractice cases. CPLR 214-a
(McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). First, if the physician commits a wrongful act and continues
treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave rise to the said act, the action
will accrue at the end of the course of treatment. Id. Second, if a foreign object is negli-
gently left in a patient's body, the statute of limitations runs from the time the patient
could have either discovered the object or have reasonably discovered the object. Id. While
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proper limitations period governing a particular action,3 New York
courts traditionally have looked to the essence of the action rather
than to the plaintiff's asserted theory of liability.4 Thus, where the
alleged wrong sounds essentially in malpractice, courts generally
have invoked the 3-year statute of limitations, despite any under-
lying contractual agreement between the parties.' It has become
unclear, however, to what extent a plaintiff can assert the existence
of an underlying contract to escape the 3-year tort limitation and
invoke the 6-year contractual statute of limitations.' Recently, in
the "continuous treatment" theory has been applied successfully to malpractice actions
against accountants and architects, see County of Broome v. Vincent J. Smith, Inc., 78 Misc.
2d 889, 892, 358 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1002 (Sup. Ct. Broome County 1974) (architect); Wilkin v.
Dana R. Pickup & Co., 74 Misc. 2d 1025, 1026, 347 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (Sup. Ct. Allegany
County 1973) (accountant), courts have not been willing to extend the "foreign object" ex-
ception in the nonmedical malpractice context, see Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
3 Generally, the purpose of a statute of limitations is to fix a "known and limited time
for the commencement of an action," thereby precluding the institution of stale claims. In
re MacDonald v. Reid, 85 Misc. 2d 291, 295, 380 N.Y.S.2d 510, 514 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County 1976). The expiration of the statute of limitations, however, merely suspends the
remedy; it does not destroy the substantive right. See Antoinette K. v. Kenneth L., 103
Misc. 2d 1011, 1013, 427 N.Y.S.2d 550, 552 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1980); In re Estate of
Hoffman, 107 Misc. 2d 497, 498, 435 N.Y.S.2d 235, 237 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1980).
4 See Carr v. Lipshie, 8 App. Div. 2d 330, 332, 187 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566 (1st Dep't 1959),
afrd, 9 N.Y.2d 983, 176 N.E.2d 512, 218 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1961). New York courts, in determin-
ing an applicable statute of limitations in suits commenced against various types of profes-
sionals, have examined the essence of the action, rather than the plaintiff's asserted ground
of recovery. See, e.g., Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669,
674, 345 N.E.2d 565, 568, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22, 24 (1976) (architect); Calhoun v. Gale, 29 App.
Div. 2d 766, 767, 287 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (2d Dep't) (physician), afl'd, 23 N.Y.2d 756, 244
N.E.2d 468, 296 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1968).
5 See, e.g., Carr v. Lipshie, 8 App. Div. 2d 330, 332, 187 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567 (1st Dep't
1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 983, 176 N.E.2d 512, 218 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1961); Wilkin v. Dana R. Pick-
up & Co., 74 Misc. 2d 1025, 1027, 347 N.Y.S.2d 122, 125 (Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1973). In
addition to invoking the 3-year statute of limitations for nonmedical malpractice actions,
New York courts have applied the 3-year limitations period where the action sounds in
negligence, despite any underlying agreement between the litigants. See, e.g., Webber v.
Herkimer & Mohawk St. R.R., 109 N.Y. 311, 314-15, 16 N.E. 358, 360 (1888) (contract of
carriage not sufficient to allow personal injury action in contract); Alyssa Originals v. Finkel-
stein, 22 App. Div. 2d 701, 701, 254 N.Y.S.2d 21, 23 (2d Dep't 1964), af'd, 24 N.Y.2d 976,
250 N.E.2d 82, 302 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1969) (tenant's lease not sufficient to allow contract action
for property damage).
6 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 396-97, 372 N.E.2d 555k
557, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 770 (1977), modifying 54 App. Div. 2d 13, 385 N.Y.S.2d 613 (2d
Dep't 1976); Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High School As'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 672, 345
N.E.2d 565, 566, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (1976). In Paver, the plaintiff alleged "breach of con-
tract" for an architect's defective design and faulty supervision of certain architectural
work. 38 N.Y.2d at 674, 345 N.E.2d at 567-68, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 24. The Court applied the 6-
year contract statute of limitations to the plaintiff's claim, stating that if a claim is "sub-
1982]
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Adler & Topal, P.C. v. Exclusive Envelope Corp.,7 the Appellate
Division, Second Department, held that a corporation's malprac-
tice and simple tort counterclaims against an accounting firm could
not be converted into contract claims on the basis of a simple con-
tractual relationship between the parties, and thus, were governed
by the 3-year tort statute of limitations.8
In Adler, the plaintiff-accounting firm performed a variety of
services for the defendant-corporation between 1972 and July 31,
1976.1 On December 4, 1979, the accounting firm sued its former
client to recover amounts overdue.10 In its answer, the corporation
denied liability and set forth three counterclaims, alleging the
firm's negligent performance of accounting services and the firm's
unlawful conversion of the defendant's property and the firm's
breach of contract in failing to exercise ordinary care.1" Relying
stantially related" to matters encompassed by the substantive agreement, it is immaterial,
in applying the statute of limitations, whether it lies in contract or tort. Id. at 676, 345
N.E.2d at 569, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 26. Hence, the claim gainst the architect, though legally
cognizable in either contract or malpractice, was timely since it was asserted within the 6-
year period of limitations. Id. Beyond its narrow holding, however, the Court of Appeals, in
dictum, suggested that the question of the applicable statute of limitations should turn
upon whether the claim is for personal injury or property damage. Id. at 675, 345 N.E.2d at
568, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 25. While the Court recognized that personal injury claims sound "es-
sentially in tort," it nevertheless stated that "when the action is one for damages to prop-
erty or pecuniary interests only, where there is a contractual agreement between the parties,
the general tendency has been to allow the plaintiff to elect to sue in contract or tort, as he
sees fit." Id. Commentators have noted that the adoption of this dictum would result in the
application of the 6-year period of limitations to nonmedical malpractice actions where the
claim is for property or pecuniary damage. See 1 WK&M 214.22a, at 2-312.
In Sears, the plaintiff brought a breach of contract action, alleging the defendant-archi-
tect's lack of professional care in the performance of contracted-for services, more than 3
but less than 6 years after the architect completed work. 54 App. Div. 2d at 15, 385
N.Y.S.2d at 614. Relying upon its decision in Paver, the Court of Appeals held that the
architect's obligations to the plaintiff arose out of the contractual relationship between the
parties, regardless of how the plaintiff framed its cause of action. 43 N.Y.2d at 396, 372
N.E.2d at 558, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 770. Thus, the Court concluded, the 6-year contract statute
of limitations was applicable to the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 395, 372 N.E.2d at 558, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 770; see CPLR 213(2).
84 App. Div. 2d 365, 446 N.Y.S.2d 337 (2d Dep't 1982).
8 Id. at 367, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
Id. at 365, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
10 Id.
" Id. at 366, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 338. The corporation alleged that the accountants had
neglected to prepare or maintain and certify certain books, records and tax returns, thereby
causing the corporation to suffer penalties, interest, and a loss of tax refunds. Id. A breach
of contract claim lodged by the corporation alleged that the accounting firm failed to file tax
returns and furnish the corporation with financial, accounting, and tax materials. Id. The
third counterclaim asserted by the defendant alleged that the plaintiff converted the corpo-
ration's books and records. Id.
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upon the Court of Appeals decision in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Enco Associates,12 the corporation maintained that since its claims
arose from the underlying oral contract with the accounting firm,
the 6-year contract statute of limitations should be applied.'" Seek-
ing to amend its reply so as to allege the expiration of the tort
statute of limitations, 4 the accounting firm contended that the de-
fendant's claims sounded in malpractice and simple tort, thereby
requiring application of the 3-year limitations period.'5 The Su-
preme Court, Special Term, however, refused to allow the plaintiff-
firm to amend its reply to any of the counterclaims asserted by the
corporation."6
In a unanimous decision, the Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, reversed, granting the accountants' motion for leave to
amend and for partial summary judgment.17 Justice Thompson,
writing for the court, reasoned that while virtually all accountant-
client relationships rest upon "some sort of bare bones agreement,"
the simple oral contract involved in this case could not convert an
ordinary malpractice claim, which had its genesis in negligence, to
a contract claim.' 8 To reach a contrary holding, the court stated,
practically would defeat the purpose of CPLR 214.19 Furthermore,
after observing that Sears involved "a detailed written agreement
which provided for specific and sophisticated services," 20 Justice
Thompson concluded that the ruling in Sears should not govern
the circumstances in the present case.21
It is submitted that the Adler Court erred in making the ap-
12 43 N.Y.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1977); see supra note 6.
13 84 App. Div. 2d at 366, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
14 Id. In addition to asserting the expiration of the 3-year limitations period, the ac-
countants sought partial summary judgment against the corporation under section 203(c) of
the CPLR. Id. Prior to the enactment of that section, a defendant was barred from alleging
a tort counterclaim when the plaintiff's contract action was brought between 3 and 6 years
of the action's accrual. See CPLR 203(c), commentary at 119 (1972). Although section 203
allows a defendant to assert an otherwise time-barred tort claim, his recovery may not ex-
ceed the amount awarded to the plaintiff on the complaint. See id.
15 84 App. Div. 2d at 366, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
16 Id. at 367, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
17 Id. at 368, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
IS Id. at 367, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
19 Id.
20 Id. In Sears, the parties entered into a contract whereby the architect was to design
and supervise the construction of a series of department store ramps. 43 N.Y.2d at 393, 372
N.E.2d at 556, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 769. The contract also called for mechanical and electrical
engineering services. Id.
21 84 App. Div. 2d at 368, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
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plicable limitations period dependent upon the form of agreement
entered into by the parties, rather than upon the question whether
such contract gave rise to the malpractice claim. As Sears clearly
suggests, where the alleged liability of the professional has its gen-
esis in the contractual relationship between the parties, the cause
of action should be governed by the 6-year contract statute of limi-
tations.22 Moreover, the only possible distinction between a "bare
bones agreement" and a "specific, written" contract may be that,
as a matter of preserving evidence, the oral agreement is more suit-
able to a shorter statute of limitations.2 " Yet, this reasoning is in-
consistent with the fact that the contract statute of limitations is 6
years regardless of whether the agreement is oral or written.2'
It appears, therefore, that a malpractice claim, involving prop-
erty or pecuniary damage and based upon an underlying contrac-
tual relationship, should be governed by the 6-year limitations pe-
riod.2 5 Indeed, under these circumstances, 26  the type of proof
22See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 395, 372 N.E.2d 555, 558,
401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 770 (1977). The Sears Court stated:
All obligations of the architects here, whether verbalized as in tort for professional
malpractice or as in contract for nonperformance of particular provisions of the
contract, arose out of the contractual relationship of the parties-i.e., absent the
contract between them, no services would have been performed and thus there
would have been no claims. It should make no difference then how the asserted
liability is classified or described, or whether it is said that, although not ex-
pressed, an agreement to exercise due care in the performance of the agreed ser-
vices is to be implied.
Id. at 396, 372 N.E.2d at 558, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 770-71.
" Statutes of limitations attempt to strike a balance between one party's right to en-
force a valid claim and another party's right to be confronted with that claim before it
becomes stale and before proof is rendered unavailable. See Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868); Connell v. Hayden, 83 App. Div. 2d 30, 41, 443
N.Y.S.2d 383, 393 (2d Dep't 1981); Commissioner of Social Servs. v. Oliver P., 97 Misc. 2d
957, 962, 412 N.Y.S.2d 987, 991 (Family Ct. Kings County 1979). See generally 63 HARv. L.
R.v. 1177, 1185 (1950) (examining the purpose of statutes of limitations in light of a defen-
dant's peace of mind and expectations). Several jurisdictions have altered their statutes of
limitations so as to account for the difficulty in preserving evidence when oral contracts are
at issue. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE §§ 337(1), 339 (Deering Supp. 1982) (establishing a 4-
year limitations period for written contracts and a 2-year limitations period for oral
contracts).
24 CPLR 213(2) (1979).
21 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 397, 372 N.E.2d 555, 559,
401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 772 (1977); Naetzker v. Brocton Central School Dist., 41 N.Y.2d 929, 930,
363 N.E.2d 351, 352, 394 N.Y.S.2d 627, 627 (1977); Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High
School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 676, 345 N.E.2d 565, 569, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22, 26 (1976). While
prior cases have held that the court should look to the "essence" of the action when deter-
mining the applicable statute of limitations, see, e.g., Carr v. Lipshie, 8 App. Div. 2d 330,
332, 187 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566 (1st Dep't 1959), af'd, 9 N.Y.2d 983, 176 N.E.2d 512, 218
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necessary to establish a prima facie case will remain substantially
unchanged irrespective of whether the claim sounds in tort or con-
tract.2 7 Furthermore, it is suggested that any concern regarding the
existence of overlapping statutes of limitations is misplaced. Since
the plaintiff who brings a malpractice action in reliance upon the
6-year contract statute of limitations is limited to a recovery of
contractual damages, in reality it is not the same action that could
have been instituted before the expiration of the 3-year tort limita-
tions period.28 Until the Court of Appeals clarifies precisely the ex-
N.Y.S.2d 62 (1961); Wilkin v. Dana R. Pickup & Co., 74 Misc. 2d 1025, 1027, 347 N.Y.S.2d
122, 125 (Sup. Ct. Allegany County 1973), these cases are distinguishable because they in-
volved personal injury actions. It is submitted that personal injury actidns should not be
governed by the 6-year contract statute of limitations, even if they arise from an underlying
contract between the parties, since the nature and extent of such injuries would be difficult
to ascertain. Indeed, the trend toward shortening the limitations period for personal injury
actions is reflected in section 214-a of the CPLR, which reduced the time within which
medical malpractice actions could be commenced. See CPLR 214-a (1979) (21/2-year limita-
tion period for medical malpractice actions). Prior to the enactment of that section, an ac-
tion to recover damages for medical malpractice was governed by the 3-year limitation pe-
riod of section 214 of the CPLR. See 1 WK&M 214-a.02, at 2-316. It should be noted,
however, that an action for personal injuries will lie in contract if a specific result has been
promised. See Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 546, 127 N.E.2d 330, 331 (1955); cf. Mar-
tin v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 43 N.Y.2d 583, 589-90, 374 N.E.2d 97, 100-01, 403 N.Y.S.2d
185, 188 (1978) (plaintiff, not in privity with the seller of a product alleged to have caused
personal injury, only possesses a cause of action in negligence or strict products liability,
rather than in breach of warranty).
26 In Paver & Wildfoerster v. Catholic High School Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 669, 345 N.E.2d
565, 382 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1976), see supra note 6, the Court of Appeals recognized that "con-
tracts and torts are not contained in the natural order but are the products of the faltering
legal grammar that men apply to the facts of life in order to make them tractable to verbal-
ized rules." 38 N.Y.2d at 678, 345 N.E.2d at 570, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
'" In Sears, the Court of Appeals recognized that, in a case where the malpractice arises
from an underlying contract between the litigants, it would be appropriate to accept evi-
dence of the professional's failure to use reasonable care in the performance of his or her
obligations under the contract. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 396,
372 N.E.2d 555, 558, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 771 (1977).
28 See id. at 397, 372 N.E.2d at 558, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 771. It is submitted that the
legislative design of section 214 of the CPLR does not preclude a malpractice action from
being governed by the 6-year statute of limitations. When the section was being drafted,
subdivision 6, which provides that a 3-year limitations period will govern actions alleging
nonmedical malpractice, "was added on the suggestion that malpractice involving property
damage-e.g., against an accountant-may be based on a contract theory and would other-
wise be governed by the 6-year provision unless specific reference was made." See SIXTH
REP. 93. Subsequently, however, the legislature refused to adopt a recommendation of the
Law Revision Commission which suggested that section 214(6) be worded explicitly to refer
to "[a]n action to recover damages for malpractice, whether based on tort, contract or any
other theory." Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature Relat-
ing to the Statute of Limitations in Malpractice Actions, [1962] N.Y. LAw REV. COMM'N
REP. 231, 232. Thus, it is submitted that the legislature's failure to adopt this language,
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tent to which an underlying contract will impact upon the limita-
tions period, however, there will continue to be confusion regarding
the statute of limitations applicable to such claims.
Edward Kelly
Article 32-Accelerated Judgment
CPLR 3211: Defendant's assertion of cross-claim against code-
fendant constitutes a waiver of his jurisdictional objection to that
codefendant's subsequent cross-claim
Before a state may subject a nondomiciliary to its judicial
processes, there must exist a predicate for jurisdiction. 9 In New
York, a party may attack the adequacy of the predicate by assert-
ing his jurisdictional defense either in a motion to dismiss the
cause of action or in the responsive pleading.30 It has been held
which adoption would have resulted in a 3-year period of limitations for malpractice actions
based on contract, indicates that a malpractice action arising from a contractual arrange-
ment may be brought within the 6-year statute of limitations.
2, See SIEGEL § 58, at 59; Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and Jurisdictional Mo-
tions in New York, 14 BuFFALo L. REv. 374, 374 (1964); Lacy, Personal Jurisdiction and
Service of Summons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 O& L. REv. 505, 509 (1978); Note: Article
III of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules: Jurisdiction, Services and Appearance,
37 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 285, 320-28 (1963). In New York, personal jurisdiction may be ob-
tained over a nondomiciliary defendant if he is served with process somewhere within the
state. SiEGEL § 59, at 60; see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878) (judgment in Oregon
state court held void for want of personal service of process on a nondomiciliary), overruled
on other grounds in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). An independent basis for in
personam jurisdiction must be established in instances where a nondomiciled defendant is
served with process outside the State of New York. See CPLR 301, 302, 313 (1972). If the
summons is served incorrectly upon the defendant within New York, the constitutional
predicate for jurisdiction nevertheless may be satisfied by an appearance on the part of the
defendant, since such appearance constitutes a waiver of the jurisdictional defense unless
the defendant reserves an objection to jurisdiction. See CPLR 320(b) (1972); Homburger &
Laufer, supra, at 375; SECOND ANN. REP. OF THE JUD. CONFEMNCE ON THE CPLR (1964), in
TENTH ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CONFERENcE 334-35 (1965); see also Legislaiion: CPLR
-Appearances, 31 BROoKLYN L. REv. 133, 134 (1964).
3o See Ranz v. Sposato, 106 Misc. 2d 156, 156, 431 N.Y.S.2d 239, 239 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1980). Section 3211(e) of the CPLR provides that an objection based upon lack of
jurisdiction "is waived if a party moves on any of the grounds set forth in subdivision (a)
without raising such objection or if, having made no objection under subdivision (a), he does
not raise such objection in the responsive pleading." CPLR 3211(e) (1970). Thus, a party
who makes a 3211(a) motion, but fails to challenge the court's in personam jurisdiction,
appears generally and waives any such objection. Roseman v. McAvoy, 92 Misc. 2d 1063,
1064, 401 N.Y.S.2d 988, 989; (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); Suriano v. Hosie, 59 Misc.
2d 973, 974, 302 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1969). In addition, if no motion
under 3211(a) is made, a defendant who neglects to raise a jurisdictional objection in his
answer is said to appear, thereby waiving the right to challenge personal jurisdiction.
